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Abstract
Parliamentary oversight of the executive plays a key role in ensuring accountability 
and is therefore central to the system of checks and balances that characterises liberal 
democracies. After 1994, South Africa aligned itself with liberal democratic ideals 
and sought to foster accountability in governance. In the South African Parliament, 
committees are considered the engine rooms of the institution and are central to the 
oversight process. Members of Parliament serving on these committees also have 
specific tools at their disposal to conduct oversight. These include deliberations 
(debates), posing written and oral questions, oversight visits, special inquiries and 
external audit opinions. By reviewing the use of these tools in relation to defence 
deployments, the study on which this article reports aimed to determine the long-term 
post-1994 trajectory of parliamentary oversight of deployments. The study used the 
timeline between Operation Boleas (Lesotho, 1998) and the Battle of Bangui (Central 
African Republic, 2013), two key post-1994 military deployments, as a demarcation 
for determining the trajectory of oversight. The study found a negative trajectory in 
terms of the oversight of deployments. In addition, committee meetings dedicated to 
deployments remained limited. Questions around deployments did not fill the vacuum 
left by a lack of committee activity. Oversight visits to deployment areas were limited 
while there was a complete dearth of in-depth analysis of deployments through special 
inquiries and external audits. The study subsequently noted that the negative trajectory 
in terms of deployment oversight cannot only be explained by the growing civil–military 
gap in South Africa, but arguably also contributed to it.
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Introduction
After 1994, South Africa’s first venture into the international deployment of 
its military commenced in September 1998. Operation Boleas, a Southern African 
Development Community (SADC) military intervention, saw at least 600 South African 
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National Defence Force (SANDF) and 200 Botswana Defence Force troops cross the 
border to Lesotho to address the country’s deteriorating security situation.1 Ensuing 
battles with units of the Lesotho Defence Force resulted in at least 11 SANDF soldiers 
being killed.2 Forward to March 2013 in the Central African Republic (CAR) where 
approximately 200 SANDF soldiers were stationed for training of the CAR’s armed 
forces (under Operation Vimbezela) and as a protection contingent for the training 
team. On 22 March 2013, the CAR’s capital, Bangui, came under attack from a Seleka 
rebel force estimated at between 4 000 and 7 000.3 With limited resistance from the 
CAR’s military, the SANDF was forced to face the onslaught. The ensuing Battle of 
Bangui resulted in 15 South African (SA) soldiers killed and 27 wounded.4 These two 
operations, 15 years apart, resulted in the most significant battle losses for the SANDF 
after 1994. 
Operation Boleas, the Battle of Bangui and many other SANDF deployments 
between 1998 and 2013, occurred in the context of a democratic South Africa that saw 
the introduction of systems of checks and balances to ensure government accountability. 
The separation of powers between the executive, the legislature and the judiciary forms 
one of the cornerstones of the checks and balances characterising liberal democracies.5 
Key to this system is the oversight role of the Parliament of South Africa (Parliament), 
notably its two defence committees, the Joint Standing Committee on Defence (JSCD) 
and the Portfolio Committee on Defence and Military Veterans (PCDMV). Oversight of 
the executive reflects one of the primary functions of parliaments around the world, as it 
aims to ensure that a state’s national resources are used efficiently and effectively.6 Yet, 
the need for accountability of military deployments through Parliament was challenged 
early in South Africa’s democratic era. Following Operation Boleas, Deiderik Perk 
found “parliamentary oversight unable to press the government on the actions of 
its defence force in times of great urgency”.7 Similar concerns were raised in 2012, 
with one Member of Parliament (MP) claiming significant shortcomings in defence 
accountability to Parliament.8 These statements bring into question the long-term 
efficiency of parliamentary oversight of the military, and specifically the deployment 
thereof, in the context of its post-1994 liberal democratic shifts.
Research problem
Parliamentary oversight is an essential component of liberal democracy. Both the 
institution of parliament9 and the act of oversight form central parts of a liberal democratic 
system due to their links to the concept of the separation of powers.10 Oversight bridges 
two core concepts, namely accountability and transparency. The aim of parliamentary 
oversight is to ensure transparency in governance and to keep government accountable 
to the electorate.11 Several institutions, including ombudspersons and audit institutions, 
fulfil the function of oversight. However, discussions on public accountability often 
highlight the central role of parliaments. It is argued that parliaments are effective 
oversight institutions because of a unique set of tools available to assist in fulfilling the 
oversight responsibility.12
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Parliamentary oversight and related accountability are also vital in the context of 
representative democracy. Representative democracy provides a clear link between the 
sovereignty of the citizens and state power.13 The role that parliaments play in bridging 
the divide between the electorate, whom they represent, and the military, representing a 
form of state power, is crucial. Through representation, parliaments play a major role in 
defining the relationship between civil society and the military in a state. Parliamentary 
oversight is critical in ensuring not only an accountable military, but also an accountable 
executive in terms of how the military is utilised. The key research problem in this study 
therefore revolved around the ability of parliaments, as institutions of representative 
democracy, to ensure executive accountability for the utilisation of the military and, 
subsequently, to serve as a conduit for balanced civil–military relations.
Aim of the study
After 1994, South Africa introduced a new constitution based on the values of 
freedom, civil liberties, human rights, equality, the implementation of a system of 
universal suffrage and electoral representation, as well as the entrenchment of a 
separation of powers between the executive, the legislature and the judiciary. These 
changes align with the fundamental building blocks of liberal democracy.14 Oversight of 
executive practices by Parliament, including the deployment of the military, is therefore 
a key means of achieving accountability and a responsive executive as envisaged in 
liberal democracies. 
The primary aim of the study reported here was to review parliamentary oversight 
of SANDF deployments between 1998 and 2013 in order to determine the trajectory of 
such oversight practices. In order to establish this trajectory, two lower-order questions 
required attention: 
•	  First, what are the means through which parliaments can conduct oversight, 
including oversight of the deployment of the military? 
•	  Second, to what extent were these means of oversight utilised in South Africa 
between 1998 and 2013?
Theoretical foundation and research approach 
The focus of the study on parliamentary oversight of defence deployments in South 
Africa traversed two sets of theoretical foundations. 
First, liberal democracy and its envisaged outcomes of transparency and 
accountability underpinned the approach of the study. Parliament as an institution, and 
the act of oversight, are essential to the concept of the separation of powers, a key 
feature of liberal democratic systems.15 As noted, South Africa’s post-1994 Constitution 
aligns with the ideals of liberal democracy. The 1996 Constitution and subsequent 
legislation and policies, such as the 1996 White Paper on Defence and the 2002 Defence 
Act (No. 42 of 2002), also point to efforts to ensure civil control and civilian oversight 
of the military. The process of parliamentary oversight in South Africa after 1994 should 
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therefore be viewed in the context of liberal democratic shifts to improve transparency 
and accountability.
Second, oversight of defence deployments is important in defining civil–military 
relations. Burk highlights the link between civil–military relations and liberalism by 
noting security of individual rights as one of the cornerstones of liberalism.16 The 
provision of security, including protection from external threats, falls within this ambit 
of rights, and requires some form of military force. This requirement must, however, 
be balanced with another liberal requirement, namely that power is not abused and 
sovereignty remains. As such, a structure of civil control of the armed forces is 
necessary for democratic civil–military relations.17 After 1994, principles of democracy 
underpinned South Africa’s approach to civil–military relations as is evident in the 1996 
White Paper on Defence, fittingly titled “Defence in a Democracy”. Parliament’s central 
role in ensuring democratic civil–military relations is reflected in the White Paper on 
Defence as it states the institution “has a range of significant powers regarding military 
affairs in order to assert democratic control over the armed forces and defence policy”.18 
In terms of methodology, the study relied mainly on secondary sources in the 
form of committee minutes from Parliament’s defence committees compiled by the 
Parliamentary Monitoring Group (PMG). This is largely due to the unavailability of 
formal committee minutes from Parliament for the years under consideration. Context 
is further provided based on information obtained through interviews with nine former 
MPs involved with Parliament’s defence committees. The information collated from 
these sources is presented along two thematic lines. First, a broad overview of legislation 
and policies in South Africa is provided to highlight the country’s approach to oversight 
of deployments. Second, the usage of recognised parliamentary oversight tools, which 
are also used to oversee defence deployments, is reviewed. 
The South African approach to defence deployments and oversight
South Africa’s adherence to liberal democratic values in relation to the utilisation 
of the military is evident in legislation. Section 198(d) of the 1996 Constitution states 
national security “is subject to the authority of Parliament and the national executive”. 
This immediately highlights a balance of powers in terms of the state’s ‘hard power’. 
This aim to balance power is also evident in further legislation guiding defence 
deployments, with specific tasks envisaged for Parliament.
Section 201 of the Constitution states that the President may authorise the 
‘employment’ of the Defence Force (1) in co-operation with the police service, (2) in 
defence of the Republic, and/or (3) in fulfilment of an international obligation.19 Later 
legislation – section 18(1) of the Defence Act (No. 42 of 2002) – also permits the 
Minister of Defence to authorise the employment of the Defence Force for service inside 
the Republic or in international waters.20 These provisions are in line with directives in 
section 227 of the Interim Constitution (1993).21 Existing legislation thus highlights 
executive dominance in terms of defence deployments, as is confirmed by Peters and 
Wagner noting, “South Africa to have no ex ante parliamentary veto power …”22 
5
South African Journal of Military Studies
While ex ante parliamentary veto power over defence deployments is not prescribed 
in SA legislation, this does not imply that Parliament has no role to play. In line with 
efforts to ensure checks and balances, post-1994 legislative amendments make specific 
provision for Parliament’s role in the oversight of defence deployments. 
Section 201(3) of the 1996 Constitution states that, should the Defence Force be 
employed, the president must inform Parliament of –
•	 the reasons for the employment of the Defence Force; 
•	 the place of employment; 
•	 the number of personnel involved; and 
•	 the period of employment. 
Furthermore, subsection 18(2)(e) of the Defence Act also advises the president or 
minister to inform Parliament of the expected expenditure of the relevant deployment. 
Section 201(4) of the 1996 Constitution further notes, “[i]f Parliament does not sit during 
the first seven days after the defence force is employed … the President must provide 
the information required to the appropriate oversight committee.”23 These requirements 
clearly aim to provide Parliament with the relevant information to conduct oversight of 
the executive’s utilisation of the Defence Force. This does, however, raise the question 
about the ex post powers of Parliament in terms of defence deployments.
In order to determine Parliament’s ex post powers of deployment, two provisions 
of the Interim Constitution should be considered. In terms of Schedule 6 (Transitional 
Arrangements, Clause 24) of the 1996 Constitution, sections 224 to 228 of the Interim 
Constitution remain in operation. These sections have specific bearing on the role of 
Parliament vis-à-vis defence deployments. First, the JSCD was tasked specifically with 
the review of deployments. Section 228(3)(a) confirms the establishment of the JSCD 
while section (3)(d) notes, “[the] Committee shall be competent to investigate and make 
recommendations regarding the budget, functioning, organisation, armaments, policy, 
morale and state of preparedness of the National Defence Force …”24 Section 228(4)(b) 
further highlights the importance of the JSCD in oversight of deployments by stating 
that, when Parliament is not in session, the “President shall summon the joint standing 
committee referred to in subsection (3) to meet expeditiously, but not later than 14 days 
after the commencement of such employment, and shall inform the committee of the 
reasons for such employment”.25
Second, section 228(4) of the Interim Constitution stipulates:
Parliament may by resolution terminate any employment referred to in 227 (1) (a), 
(b) or (e), but such termination of employment shall not affect the validity of anything 
done in terms of such employment up to the date of such termination, or any right, 
privilege, obligation or liability acquired, accrued or incurred as at the said date and by 
virtue of such employment.26 
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The latter section of the Interim Constitution is crucial as it provides Parliament 
with a potential overriding directive for influencing defence deployments ex post. This 
approach demonstrates alignment with the envisaged post-1994 system of checks and 
balances and the centrality of parliamentary oversight.
Tools available for parliamentary oversight of defence deployments
Given that the post-1994 legislative scope provided for parliamentary oversight as 
a means of balancing executive dominance, parliamentary capacity to conduct such 
oversight is required. Existing literature highlights the importance of parliamentary 
committees in the oversight process. It is commonly held that committees are the 
‘engine rooms’ of parliaments and that these committees contribute substantially to 
the effectiveness of parliaments.27 Given the important role prescribed for the JSCD in 
overseeing defence deployments, it is essential to consider the tools that are available at 
committee level to effect such oversight.
International literature and reviews of global parliamentary practices reveal broad 
consensus on oversight tools available to committees. Tools most commonly referenced 
are committee hearings, commissions of inquiry (including ad hoc committees) as well 
as parliamentary questions and interpellations. These tools are evidently derived from 
organisational procedures and are not necessarily resulting from existing theory. They 
nonetheless provide accepted empirical indicators for oversight within which to locate 
tools for oversight of the military. Research on such oversight has been conducted by, 
inter alia, three reputable international institutions, namely the Inter-Parliamentary 
Union (IPU), the Centre for the Democratic Control of the Armed Forces (DCAF) and 
Transparency International.28 A review of analyses by these institutions allows for the 
identification of five specific oversight tools that are central to oversight of defence, 
including deployments.
•	  Defence committee debates. The aim of debates is to influence a committee’s 
collective decision on a specific aspect of defence governance. Such debates 
allow a unique opportunity for obtaining facts on military affairs, including 
deployments, from the executive or addressing defence-related aspects of 
major concern.
•	  Parliamentary questions. Questions from MPs to the executive can be 
submitted either orally or in written form. The significance of questions lies in 
the opportunity afforded to MPs to raise military-related concerns and receive 
timely responses. Parliamentary questions offer an opportunity for continuous 
oversight of defence deployments.
•	  Special defence inquiries. Special inquiries are characterised by in-depth 
engagement in terms of specific defence-related aspects. During special 
inquiries, parliamentary committees often engage expert opinions and 
may subpoena certain role players. Following an inquiry, a formal report 
is published. Inquiries of this nature can be done by parliamentary defence 
committees, multiple committees, subcommittees or ad hoc committees. 
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•	  Oversight visits. Oversight visits for defence purposes relate to visits by MPs 
(often as a committee) to military units and/or operational deployment areas 
in an effort to familiarise themselves with matters at ground level.
•	  The use of external audit. External audit may be outside the scope of 
parliaments, but could play an important role in effective oversight. Practically, 
this would include calling external auditors (or state auditors) to appear before 
parliamentary committees or requesting in-depth analysis from such auditors. 
Audits may include financial and non-financial aspects. 
Reviewing oversight of defence deployments in South Africa
Based on the internationally recognised oversight tools available to parliamentary 
committees, the utilisation of these tools at committee level can be reviewed to 
determine the level of oversight of defence deployments. Specific attention should be 
paid to the role of the JSCD, given its constitutional mandate, but peripheral oversight of 
deployments by the PCDMV may also be considered. The review relates to committee 
activity on deployments between 1998 and 2013 (see Table 1 for deployments considered 
by Parliament).
Defence committee debates
Given executive privilege in terms of defence deployments, Parliament is generally 
informed in writing of such deployments immediately after commencement. Letters 
from the Presidency are then published in Parliament’s Announcements, Tablings and 
Committee (ATC) Reports and referred to the JSCD.29 As such, committee debates 
around deployments occur most frequently as part of discussions around presidential 
letters of employment.
Operation Boleas was the SANDF’s first major regional deployment, as part of 
a SADC regional peacekeeping force. The security situation in Lesotho decreased 
significantly after King Letsie III disbanded the Parliament of Lesotho, resulting in 
widespread dissatisfaction by opposition parties and a mutiny by some Lesotho Defence 
Force soldiers. The SANDF’s entry of Lesotho on 22 September 1998 followed a request 
by the Prime Minister of Lesotho, Pakalitha Mosisili, who called for intervention by 
the SADC.30 Given South Africa’s post-1994 shift to a system of enhanced checks and 
balances, an opportunity existed to entrench in-depth parliamentary oversight of the 
deployment of the SANDF. However, challenges to effective oversight were immediately 
apparent. Parliament’s ATCs reveal that the presidential letter of deployment to 
Lesotho was received on 22 September 1998.31 Yet, the JSCD only deliberated on this 
deployment more than a month later, on 2 November 1998.32 This was a rather extensive 
briefing by the Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs, the Deputy Minister of Defence, and 
the Operational Commander. Nonetheless, the inaction by Parliament in the first month 
after deployment showed a lack of immediate oversight capacity. This sentiment was 
shared by an opposition MP, Mr Smit, who “thanked the SANDF for the informative 
briefing and stated the fact that the National Party had asked for such a meeting already 
on the 26 [of] October”.33 
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Following Operation Boleas, the SANDF’s next major foreign deployment came in 
the form of a peacekeeping deployment to Burundi in October 2001.34 This operation 
also escaped elevated levels of oversight. According to the ATC, the presidential letter 
of deployment for the SANDF mission to Burundi was submitted to Parliament only two 
days after the deployment date of 29 October 2001.35 On 30 October 2001, the JSCD 
held its first meeting, which touched on the Burundi deployment. Subsequent meetings 
on the deployment were held in November 2001 and March 2002.36 While this sequence 
of events highlights a more structured oversight approach than, for example, in the case 
of Operation Boleas, concerns did emerge. The haste with which the deployment took 
place did not allow for thorough engagement by Parliament. A Cabinet Memorandum 
approving the deployment was only signed in February 2002.37 Furthermore, in the first 
JSCD meeting on the deployment, MPs raised concern about not being briefed properly 
on the deployment and having to rely on media reports for information.38 This process 
exposes that, even when constitutional protocol was followed, it did not necessarily 
ensure thorough oversight.
Of specific concern regarding the work of the JSCD is that, except for the limited 
oversight of deployments to Lesotho and Burundi, further debates around deployments 
were limited. Committee meetings on the SADC Mutual Defence Pact and the White 
Paper on Peacekeeping (1999) dealt with aspects of deployments, but not with 
specific deployments. These meetings were rather concerned with policy directives 
on deployments and skipped oversight of actual SANDF deployments. The lack of 
oversight is of specific concern given that Parliament’s ATCs reveal several presidential 
letters for a number of deployments to, inter alia, Angola, Tanzania and the Democratic 
Republic of the Congo (DRC) (in 1998), Mozambique (1999–2001), the Comoros 
(2001) and Iran (2004). Thus, while the executive complied with the formal legislative 
requirements for military deployments by informing Parliament, the legislature did not 
deliberate on all of these deployments. 
Parliament saw an important shift in focus from legislation to oversight from the 
Third Parliament (2004) onwards. In 2004, Parliament’s presiding officers noted the 
“increasingly important oversight role” of the institution.39 The Strategic Plan for the 
Third Parliament also reaffirms the shift in focus by emphasising the institution’s 
development of the Parliamentary Oversight Model.40 With this institutional shift in 
mind and with two committees overseeing defence, the potential for quality oversight 
of the military increased considerably. This also raised the potential for parliamentary 
focus on defence deployments. 
Despite an institutional shift to focus on oversight, a review of presidential letters 
published in the ATC after 2004, and debates on these letters in the JSCD, reveal significant 
shortcomings. Table 1 reflects the number of meetings held between 2004 and 2013 
where such letters were considered. Visible shortcomings include the fact that several 
years (2004, 2009, 2010, 2012) saw no debates on deployment letters. Furthermore, on 
at least four occasions, the JSCD could not make a decision on deployments due to the 
lack of a quorum. It can therefore be concluded that the consideration of deployment 
letters happened only on an ad hoc basis and, when deliberated, it was often delayed in 
relation to the actual deployment dates.
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Table 1: Meetings by the JSCD to consider presidential deployment letters 2004–2013
Year Letters considered Outcome
2004 None -
2005 All external deployment41 Letters adopted
2006
Comoros deployment42 No quorum to adopt letters
DRC deployment43 No quorum to adopt letters
Lesotho deployment44 Letter adopted
2007
DRC and Burundi deployments45 Letters adopted
West Indies, Nepal and Mozambique46 Letters adopted
Uganda deployment47 Letter adopted
2008 Darfur and deployments with SAPS48 Adoption postponed
2009 None –
2010 None –
2011 DRC, CAR, Mozambique deployments49 No quorum to adopt letters
2012 None –
2013
Deployments with SAPS and Mozambique50 No quorum to adopt letters
All internal and external deployments51
Inconclusive, but quorum was 
achieved
In addition to the ad hoc consideration of presidential deployment letters, dedicated 
committee meetings dealing with specific SANDF deployments remained limited 
between 2004 and 2013. The JSCD only held two such meetings dealing with SANDF 
deployments – those in the DRC (2006)52 and in the CAR (2013).53 Over the same 
period, the PCDMV held three dedicated meetings related to deployments. An extensive 
briefing was received on all peacekeeping operations in 2004.54 In 2005, the PCDMV 
received a briefing on SANDF missions in the DRC, Sudan and Burundi,55 and in 2010, 
a briefing on border deployments was presented.56 The review of letters and sporadic 
meetings on deployments over a 15-year period paints a concerning picture. It started in 
1998 with serious concerns around oversight of Operation Boleas. Limited consideration 
of presidential letters of deployment is evident in subsequent years. In December 2012, 
the SA government made a choice not to withdraw a small SANDF training team in the 
CAR, but rather to reinforce them with additional forces to ensure their safety and the 
safety of SA weapons and equipment in the CAR. This deployment, like many before it, 
also escaped parliamentary oversight. The subsequent advance of the Seleka rebels and 
the Battle of Bangui only saw ex post parliamentary oversight. No progress in terms of 
the committee’s oversight process over this period is thus apparent.
The review of committee activity above, specifically that of the JSCD as the vehicle 
for deployment oversight, shows that the committee lacked capacity to foster robust 
debate. An MP interviewed indicated that parliamentary scheduling clashes contribute 
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to a lack of opportunities for the JSCD to get together.57 This would, to some extent, 
explain the limited engagement on deployments. However, the large number of 
deployments not considered over a prolonged period, points to a shortcoming in the 
parliamentary will to engage defence deployments actively. This shortcoming is perhaps 
best illustrated by debates around Operation Boleas and the Battle of Bangui. Following 
both deployments, only one meeting was held by the JSCD. These two deployments, 
with significant battle losses, received scant oversight attention as opposed to other less 
casualty-prone deployments. Single-meeting reviews, with limited scope for debate, 
highlight a lack of oversight. The 2013 JSCD meeting following the Battle of Bangui 
illustrates this point well as, following a briefing by the Minister of Defence and one 
round of questions from MPs, the meeting was called to a close. Some MPs argued, 
“[m]embers wanted to return to their constituencies and had flights booked.”58 
Interviews with former MPs also highlight the lack of robust debate on deployments. 
Key challenges noted by MPs were delays in discussions of presidential letters and, 
where such letters were considered, these were merely ‘box-ticking exercises’.59 An 
MP further noted that the Chief of the SANDF or the Chief of Joint Operations was 
hardly ever present to be interrogated on deployments.60 Several MPs again pointed to 
the lack of oversight of the Battle of Bangui in particular as illustrating the weakness of 
oversight of deployments and commenting that it did not contribute to a broader debate 
in the SA public.61 
Parliamentary questions62
Parliamentary questions, both oral and written, allow MPs an alternative avenue 
through which to gather information and exercise oversight of defence deployments. A 
review of Parliament’s oral and written questions revealed that 2 035 oral and written 
questions on defence were posed between 1994 and 2013 of which 222 (10,91%) related 
directly to deployment matters.63 As a point of departure, it should be noted that, prior 
to Operation Boleas in 1998, questions were used to a limited extent with 25 questions 
related to deployments posed between 1994 and 1997. This trend continued until the end 
of the First Parliament (1999) after which parliamentary questions were increasingly 
used. Crucially, only three oral questions and no written questions related to Operation 
Boleas were posed in the year after the deployment (1999).
From 2000 onwards, a significant increase in the number of questions around 
internal and external deployments of the SANDF can be observed (see Figure 1). While 
some questions related to external deployments in Mozambique and the DRC, the vast 
majority of oral and written questions related to border safeguarding deployments and 
internal deployments with the South African Police Service (SAPS). Crucially though, 
the Second Parliament (1999–2004) saw an increased use of parliamentary questions 
on deployments. During the Third Parliament (2004–2009), this trend decreased 
significantly with limited questions posed. This trajectory of questioning is in contrast 
to statements by Parliament’s presiding officers, namely that the institution intended on 
focusing increasingly on oversight from 2004 onwards. During the Fourth Parliament 
(2009–2013), questions on deployments also remained limited, except for 2013 when 
29 questions were posed. The majority of these referred to the Battle of Bangui.
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Figure 1: Frequency of parliamentary questions related to operations (1994–2013)
Further analysis of parliamentary questions raised two additional concerns 
regarding accountability for deployments. First, the number of oral questions related to 
deployments decreased significantly over time (see Figure 2). From 1994 to 2002, most 
questions on deployments were posed as oral questions to a member of the executive 
during a sitting of the houses of Parliament. From 2002 onwards, most questions related 
to deployment were posed in written format. This is significant as it raises the concern 
that members of the executive were not brought before the houses of Parliament to 
answer regularly on deployments. For example, only three oral questions on the 
SANDF’s involvement in the CAR were posed in 2013. 
Figure 2: Written and oral questions on defence deployments (1994–2013)
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Second, a review of questions on defence deployments reflected a significant 
disparity between questions posed by MPs from the ruling party and those from 
opposition parties. Of the 222 questions related to defence deployments between 1994 
and 2013, only 32 (14,41%) were from MPs of the ruling party. Furthermore, notably 
after 1998, the majority of questions put forward by MPs from the ruling party were 
oral questions. From 1998 to 2013, ruling-party MPs posed 26 questions related to 
deployments of which 23 (88,46%) were oral questions. This is significant as it reveals 
that, except through formal sittings of the houses of Parliament, MPs from the ruling 
party showed little willingness to question the executive on deployments. This also 
undermined an effort at continuous oversight achievable through written questions. This 
approach was particularly evident in questions around Operation Boleas and the Battle 
of Bangui. Ruling-party MPs posed no oral or written questions related to these two 
deployments.64 In-depth inquiry on deployments was therefore left to opposition MPs.
Context on the use of parliamentary questions is important. An MP interviewed 
noted that the limited utilisation of questions by ruling-party MPs is generally a function 
of politics and not a function of work ethics, as it is normal for ruling-party MPs not to 
reflect overly negative on departments. It is thus a self-imposed restriction.65 Other MPs 
noted that increased focus on social spending and economic development took the focus 
away from defence and may have resulted in a decrease in the number of questions 
asked.66 While the above reasons offer mitigating circumstances for the low number of 
questions posed by ruling-party MPs, some MPs stated that the low number of questions 
asked was directly related to a lack of political will to conduct oversight. They argued 
that written questions were generally not forthcoming from ruling-party MPs largely 
due to party loyalty.67 The differentiation between Parliament and the executive thus 
became convoluted and accountability suffered. 
Based on a review of parliamentary questions, it is evident that this tool was not 
optimally utilised to oversee deployments. Questions remained limited, except in 
the Second Parliament, and did not show continuous oversight efforts. Limited oral 
questions reflect poor levels of engagement with members of the executive through 
the houses of Parliament, and ruling-party MPs showed limited interest in oversight of 
deployments.
Oversight visits
Interviews revealed that MPs generally perceive oversight visits as a positive 
oversight tool and that they find conducting such visits to be constructive.68 The value 
of oversight visits in terms of deployments of the SANDF is that MPs come into contact 
with the operational realities of deployed forces. This, in turn, shapes questioning to 
departmental officials and, ultimately, parliamentary recommendations. 
The Rules of the National Assembly (Rule 61) note that a report should be submitted 
to the National Assembly by any committee on its activities, including oversight visits.69 
For an oversight visit to have an impact, the publishing of a committee report is thus a 
prerequisite. However, a review of Parliament’s ATCs, in which oversight visit reports 
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are published, showed limited engagements related to deployments. Between 1998 and 
2013, only two tabled reports dealt directly with oversight of deployments. First, in 
October 2005, a joint PCDMV/JSCD oversight visit to SANDF forces deployed in the 
DRC was conducted.70 Second, in April 2010, the PCDMV conducted an oversight visit 
to various border areas to review border safeguarding deployments.71 Other oversight 
visits may have related indirectly to defence deployments. For example, in 2001, the 
PCDMV and JSCD jointly conducted an oversight visit to Nigeria focusing on, inter 
alia, peacekeeping in Africa, force preparation, border control and parliamentary 
oversight of the military.72 In 2011, the JSCD conducted an oversight visit to Pretoria, 
which included a briefing by the Chief of the Navy on the threat of piracy.73 In 2013, 
the PCDMV visited various military bases around the country.74 While aspects related 
to deployments formed part of the latter oversight visits, it is crucial to note the limited 
number of oversight visits dedicated specifically to deployments or taking place 
in deployment areas. This resulted in a lack of first-hand knowledge of perilous and 
expensive SANDF operations as well as a limited first-hand understanding of force 
preparation.
The concepts of deployment and force preparation are highly intertwined. The 
JSCD has a special role to play as section 228(3)(d) of the Interim Constitution provides 
specifically for the committee to oversee the “state of preparedness of the National 
Defence Force”.75 The value of oversight visits to understanding force preparation 
was highlighted in, for example, the JSCD’s 2005 Report following its visit to the 
DRC. During this visit, observations were made regarding the function, logistics and 
discipline of the SANDF, and practical challenges faced.76 Despite the value of such 
visits, it is crucial to note the limited extent to which the JSCD conducted oversight 
visits of any kind between 1998 and 2013. A review of JSCD activities revealed that 
almost all its oversight visits occurred in the time of the Third Parliament (2004–2009).77 
The dearth of oversight visits by the JSCD was raised as a concern by MPs during the 
Fourth Parliament (2009-2014). At a meeting on 12 June 2013, MPs from the ruling 
and opposition parties highlighted “the importance of this committee going out to do 
oversight”.78 MPs also expressed frustration with the long process of receiving approval 
for such visits. The non-utilisation of oversight visits to deployments is reflected in the 
fact that no deployment-specific oversight visits followed Operation Boleas and neither 
did any such visits take place in the years preceding the Battle of Bangui.
The broader context of the utilisation of oversight visits as an oversight tool is 
also important. The tool was used with increasing regularity in Parliament, specifically 
since the Third Parliament (2004). For example, between 2004 and 2013, the PCDMV 
conducted ten oversight visits and the JSCD, a total of three. In addition, these two 
committees conducted two external study tours.79 However, despite oversight visits 
being viewed as a positive oversight tool and being utilised increasingly, such visits did 
not focus on defence deployments. 
Special defence inquiries
Special defence inquiries are characterised by in-depth engagement in specific 
defence-related aspects and may include inquiries into deployments. A review of 
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JSCD and PCDMV activities revealed that special inquiries, either at committee 
or subcommittee level, were highly underutilised between 1998 and 2013. Special 
inquiries were only conducted by the PCDMV in relation to arms acquisitions in 199980 
and a review of the 1998 Defence Review in 2004.81 The JSCD conducted one special 
inquiry into the language policy of the Department of Defence in 1999.82 Of these, 
only the PCDMV’s 2004 inquiry into the Defence Review touched on aspects related 
to deployments, largely associated with the deployability of HIV-positive SANDF 
members. 
The lack of special inquiries, specifically by the JSCD, is of concern given the 
committee’s constitutional directive to ‘investigate’ and ‘make recommendations’. 
Concerns in terms of the limited number of special defence inquiries were confirmed 
by MPs who noted few inquiries and the underutilisation of subcommittees to conduct 
special investigations. Crucially, interviewees also highlighted that even significant 
military events, such as Operation Boleas, shootings in military bases and the SANDF 
losses in the CAR did not result in special inquiries.83 As noted, both Operation Boleas 
and the Battle of Bangui were followed by one JSCD meeting each. Although these 
meetings did not comprise in-depth inquiries, they present stark contrasts in oversight. 
Following Operation Boleas, the JSCD meeting comprised a briefing by the Deputy 
Minister of Foreign Affairs, the Deputy Minister of Defence, the Chief of the SANDF, 
the SANDF’s operational commander and other SANDF commanders. The briefing 
referred to ‘weak points identified’ and ‘lessons learnt’ by the SANDF.84 In contrast, 
the 2013 JSCD meeting on the Battle of Bangui comprised a briefing by the Minister of 
Defence and limited responses to some questions by the Chief of the Joint Operations 
Division.85 This comparison underscores the notion that not only was special inquiries 
lacking, but limited inquiry into the two most significant battle losses for the SANDF 
showed contextual regression. 
The use of external audit
External audit opinions utilised by Parliament were mostly those of the Auditor-
General of South Africa (AGSA). While AGSA focuses largely on auditing public 
sector expenditure and performance, it also produces “reports on discretionary audits, 
performance audit, and other special audits are also produced”.86 As such, AGSA can be 
called upon to provide an objective external investigation into specific deployments and 
provide such information to Parliament to assist its oversight function. 
Between 1998 and 2003, no direct briefings by AGSA to the JSCD or PCDMV were 
recorded. On only three occasions did committee minutes refer to AGSA’s input on the 
budgets of the military.87 Ad hoc presentations to the committees were made between 
2004 and 2008, also related to budgetary and performance assessments. From 2009 
onwards, input from AGSA to the PCDMV and the JSCD became institutionalised with 
annual presentations made to Parliament on defence matters. Crucially, though, these 
audit options related almost exclusively to AGSA’s annual audit reports on the finances 
and performance areas of the Department of Defence. A former MP interviewed 
confirmed the incremental use of the AGSA’s work by Parliament’s defence committees, 
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but also noted that this was largely limited to one engagement per year during the 
annual report reviews.88 No special audits specifically dedicated to deployments were 
completed by AGSA and presented to Parliament between 1998 and 2013, nor was there 
any evidence of such audits being commissioned by Parliament. 
Conclusion
South Africa’s post-1994 shift to liberal democracy, notably the separation of powers, 
provided a platform for thorough parliamentary oversight of the executive. Parliament’s 
oversight role became increasingly prioritised, as is evident from the growing focus on 
committee work and the 2004 decision by presiding officers to focus on the oversight 
function of the institution. Clear constitutional provisions and parliamentary rules 
further provide specifically for parliamentary oversight of defence deployments.
The study reported here drew from accepted empirical indicators of parliamentary 
oversight to review Parliament’s oversight of defence deployments. These indicators 
reveal that JSCD and PCDMV meetings dedicated to deployments remained limited 
while the adoption of presidential deployment letters occurred on an ad hoc basis 
and were often delayed. Parliamentary questions regarding deployments did show an 
increase in some years, but failed to fill the oversight vacuum left by a lack of committee 
activity. Oversight visits to deployment areas were lacking; therefore, not contributing 
to MP’s exposure to and oversight of deployments. There was also a lack of in-depth 
analysis of deployments, both in terms of special inquiries and of the work of AGSA. 
The absence of special investigations by committees is of specific concern in cases of 
importance to the SANDF’s operational capacity, such as Operation Boleas and the 
Battle of Bangui. A lack of special investigations indicates that not even major battle 
losses were an incentive for increased oversight of deployments. Based on this analysis, 
the study found that, between 1998 and 2013, parliamentary oversight of defence 
deployments reflects a negative trajectory with decreasing levels of oversight over time.
The negative trajectory of oversight of defence deployments points to specific 
concerns around South Africa’s adherence to liberal democratic values. While 
Parliament continues to function and provide a platform for oversight, the depth of this 
oversight can be questioned, as per the outcome of this study. This detracts from the 
liberal democratic principles of accountability and transparency. The central implication 
of this want of accountability and transparency is executive dominance. The notion of 
a true separation of powers with effective power balances between the different spheres 
of government thus comes under pressure. Furthermore, although not the main aim of 
the current study, it becomes evident that the notion of executive dominance is central 
to the negative trajectory of oversight. Several interviews with MPs as well as concerns 
regarding the use of parliamentary questions, point to a lack of political will to hold the 
executive to account. 
The declining oversight of military deployments also has a negative effect on 
civil–military relations. As noted, declining oversight diminishes accountability and 
transparency; thus, limiting contact between the electorate (as represented by MPs) and 
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the military. Furthermore, while Parliament should serve as a nucleus for debate, limited 
information around military deployments become available due to limited oversight. 
The decline in oversight therefore contributes to the distancing of civil society from the 
use of the military. This conclusion is in line with findings by, for example, Heinecken, 
Gueli and Neethling who point to a growing civil–military gap in South Africa.89 
The negative trajectory in terms of oversight of deployments can therefore not only 
be explained by the growing civil–military gap in South Africa, but it arguably also 
contributed to it.
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